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In this paper we consider the problem of accommodating indigenous cultural heritage values in 
resource assessment and valuation. We suggest a need for price-based approaches to valuation 
to be replaced by or complemented with quantitative constraints, reflecting the requirement that 
rights should not be violated.
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Since the landmark Australian High Court ruling in Mabo v State of Queensland (No. 2) 1992, 
the traditional rights of indigenous Australians to natural resources have been accorded greater 
legal and public recognition in natural resource management. The challenge of meeting the 
increasing  demand  from  Australian  policy-makers  for  indigenous  cultural  heritage  values 
shares similarities with the demand for environmental values that arose in the early 1980s. In 
particular, both types of values include large non-use and indirect-use components that are not 
traded in markets.
Economists  and  other  analysts  have  developed  various  methods  to  assess  policies  where 
tradeoffs must be made between environmental and other social objectives. The aim of this 
paper  is  to  consider  which,  if  any,  of  these  methods  are  likely  to  be  appropriate  when 
indigenous cultural heritage values are important. Adopting the distinction between price-based 
and quantity-based techniques made by Venn and Quiggin (2005), it is argued that the central 
focus  on  prices,  which  is  characteristic  of  standard  methods  of  non-market  valuation,  is 
unlikely to be appropriate in indigenous cultural contexts.
The  paper  begins  by  considering  several  methods  employed  to  assess  alternative  resource 
management strategies. A review of empirical studies that have valued non-traded goods and 
services in indigenous cultures follows. Next, factors that are likely to contribute to the failure 
of efforts to value indigenous cultural heritage are discussed. Attention is then turned to two 
case studies, those of Wik forestry on Cape York Peninsula, north-eastern Australia, and water 
policy reform in the Murray–Darling Basin of south-eastern Australia. We argue that quantity-
based techniques (particularly goal programming) are likely to be suitable for incorporating 
indigenous cultural heritage in policy analysis. Concluding comments are made and possible 
future developments considered.
Price and Quantity Methods for Policy Analysis
Two broad approaches to the assessment of complex resource management issues have been 
considered in the literature: benefit–cost analysis (BCA) and multiple criteria analysis (MCA). 
Venn and Quiggin (2005) argue for an alternative classification, distinguishing between price-
2based  and  quantity-based  approaches.  In  this  section,  we  briefly  summarise  some  points 
relevant to the current problem.
BCA is the classic example of a price-based approach. The central task in BCA is the derivation 
of market or shadow prices for all project outputs and inputs under consideration. Other issues 
considered  in  the  BCA  literature,  such  as  discounting  and  the  treatment  of  risk  may  be 
interpreted as providing time-dated and state-contingent shadow prices.
Traditional applications of BCA were seen as providing a partial valuation, focused on market 
benefits and costs, but also including some relatively easy to estimate non-traded benefits and 
costs such as time savings. Most non-market values were left for political or social evaluation 
processes.  Increasingly,  however,  practitioners  of  BCA  have  aimed  at  ‘total  economic 
valuation’, in which monetary valuations of non-market benefits and costs are made for all 
relevant  factors,  including  impacts  on  ecosystem  services.  Thus,  total  economic  valuation 
represents a purely price-based approach to policy analysis.
Total economic valuation requires techniques for eliciting monetary valuations of non-market 
goods and services. Elicitation techniques may also be classified as price-based or quantity-
based. The obvious price-based approach to valuation of project outputs is the use of direct 
questions of the form ‘How much would you be willing to pay for one additional unit of output 
x?’. Experience has shown that questions of this sort rarely yield useful responses, and a range 
of alternative methods have been developed, usually incorporating quantitative information. 
The most popular approach has been the referendum or ‘dichotomous choice’ model in which 
respondents  are  asked  to  make  choices  between  pairs  of  options,  commonly  framed  as 
hypothetical  referendums.  This  approach  represents  a  substantial  shift  from  price-based  to 
quantity-based representations of the problem. The polar alternative to direct price questioning 
is choice modelling, where preferences are elicited over vectors of quantities. Choice modelling 
techniques have been incorporated into price-based BCA through the inclusion of a monetary 
payment, resulting in a mixture of price and quantity information.
To the extent that MCA values are derived by forming weighted sums of various ‘scores’ or 
outcome measures for a discrete set of management strategies, MCA is a price-based approach, 
3with practitioner or expert judgement being used in place of economic analysis to derive the 
relative prices. For this reason, many economists are critical of the high level of subjectivity that 
can enter an MCA model, asserting that any alternative can be found optimal by varying the 
weights,  the  criteria  against  which  the  performance  of  policy  options  are  measured,  and 
methods for ranking policy options against the criteria (Bureau of Transport Economics 1999; 
Bennett 2000; Dumsday forthcoming). 
These criticisms may be valid in particular cases. However, many MCA approaches do not 
employ arbitrary weights and are more appropriately considered as incorporating a mixture of 
price-based  and  quantity-based  information.  Information  about  the  preferences  of  decision-
makers is incorporated in the form of quantity constraints and targets that define the decision 
space, and weights (shadow prices) that direct the algorithm search for optimal policies within 
the decision space, rather than unit prices alone. 
Goal  programming,  an  extension  of  linear  programming  to  accommodate  problems  with 
multiple goals defined in non-commensurate units, is one of the oldest and most widely used 
continuous  MCA  techniques.  A  single  objective  function  is  still  maximised  or  minimised 
subject to a matrix of (hard) constraints; however, it is actually composed of several goals (soft 
constraints), which are the multiple objectives the decision-makers wish to achieve. In contrast 
to linear programming, the actual objectives do not appear in the objective function. Instead, the 
objective function of a goal programming model comprises the weighted sum of unwanted 
deviations from the aspiration (target) levels of goals, and the aim of goal programming is to 
minimise the unwanted deviations. Prices are implicit in the weights placed on deviations.
In all economic problems, there is a duality between prices and quantities. At given quantities, 
marginal  trade-offs  define  shadow  prices.  Conversely,  price  data  may  be  used  to  estimate 
quantitative relationships using standard duality techniques. Thus, the issue is not to determine 
whether price-based or quantity-based methods are ‘correct’, but to determine which will make 
the best use of limited available information, and human and financial resources.
Non-Market Valuation in Indigenous Cultural Contexts
Price-based  approaches  to  policy  analysis  require  non-market  valuation  methods  that  are 
4founded on theory primarily developed in the context of developed market societies, where 
people are accustomed to trading a wide range of goods and services for money. They have 
been  widely  applied  in  Western  cultural  contexts  to  inform  natural  resource  managers  and 
increasingly to assess non-use values of tangible cultural heritage assets (mostly European and 
North American buildings and paintings) (Navrud and Ready 2002). 
Even in the context of a developed market society, economists, ecologists and environmentalists 
have expressed doubts about the degree to which non-market valuation techniques can estimate 
total economic value (Sagoff 1988, Diamond and Hausman 1994, Carson et al. 2001, Nunes 
and van den Bergh 2001, Chee 2004). It is likely that members of indigenous cultures hold 
many more non-use and indirect-use values than non-indigenous people. In this context, sacred 
values are particularly important, and particularly resistant to price-based trade-offs.
If  the  value  of  indigenous  cultural  heritage  cannot  be  captured  by  price-based  valuation 
approaches, then indigenous values will be systematically underrepresented relative to non-
indigenous  values  in  price-based  economic  analyses  of  alternative  resource  management 
policies.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  consider  whether  these  methods  are  applicable  in 
indigenous cultural contexts.
Internationally, a number of studies have attempted to value elements of indigenous cultural 
heritage with price-based techniques (Godoy et al. 1995; Melnyk and Bell 1996; Haener et al. 
2001;  Boxall  et  al.  2003;  Adamowicz  et  al.  2004).  Australian  studies  include  analyses  of 
commercial  benefits  from  indigenous  cultural  heritage  (Janke  1998;  Zeppel  2001)  and  the 
replacement value of subsistence production (Altman 1987; Asafu-Adjaye 1996). However, all 
of  these  studies  focussed  on  use  values  only  and  there  appears  to  be  no  history  of  total 
economic valuation of indigenous cultural heritage.
A choice modelling study by Rolfe and Windle (2003) appears to be the only published attempt 
to estimate non-use values of indigenous cultural heritage protection in Australia and possibly 
the world. That research assessed tradeoffs between the development of water resources and 
associated impacts on environmental and indigenous cultural heritage protection in the Fitzroy 
Basin of central Queensland. 
5Three  groups  of  people  were  sampled  in  the  study  -  the  indigenous  population  of 
Rockhampton, and the general populations of  Rockhampton and Brisbane. The indigenous 
group valued cultural heritage protection much higher than the general population groups, who 
were found to be more concerned about environmental issues. However, many indigenous 
residents of Rockhampton are not traditional owners from the Fitzroy Basin, being spiritually 
connected with land distant from the study area (Windle pers. comm., 2005). Partly as a result 
of  such  considerations,  Rolfe  and  Windle  (2003)  did  not  aggregate  indigenous  and  non-
indigenous valuations of cultural heritage, choosing instead to leave the decision about relative 
weights for each group’s valuation to policy-makers.
Challenges of Non-market Valuation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage
Adamowicz et al. (1998) reviewed North American indigenous value systems and found that, 
in addition to the traditionally identified contingent valuation method (CVM) biases, there are 
likely to be several areas where non-market valuation efforts may fail. Many impediments to 
successful  application  of  CVM  are  also  applicable  to  other  stated  preference  techniques, 
including choice modelling. An adaptation of the Adamowicz et al. (1998) classification of 
failings follows, with six additional factors (asterisked) likely to be relevant in studies valuing 
Australian indigenous cultural heritage. These factors are briefly discussed in an Australian 
context.
(i) Challenges in  eliciting  individual  valuation  responses  from  indigenous  people  
because  of:
 (a) lack of substitutability between goods;
 (b) unfamiliarity with the purchasing power of money and the absence of an 
alternative numeraire*;
 (c) poor English and numeracy skills*;
 (d) the low level of knowledge and understanding that indigenous people have 
about non-indigenous forms of natural resource management*;
(e) problems of interviewer and compliance bias*
(f) the property rights regime perceived by the respondent;
 (g) the tendency for indigenous people to accumulate and share wealth among 
6larger groupings of individuals than households*; and
(h) low satiation limits for some indigenous people.
(ii) Challenges in aggregating the responses of indigenous people because of:
 (a) the political decision-making system in indigenous communities; 
(b) gender, generational and other demographic effects on values attributed to 
cultural heritage;
(c) cultural diversity between traditional owner groups*; and
(d) the need to distinguish between traditional owner groups and the local 
indigenous community*.
(iii) Challenges in aggregating indigenous and non-indigenous responses because of:
(a) the use of different numeraires to value cultural heritage;
(b) systematic differences in income levels; and
(c) differences in political structures.
Challenges eliciting individual valuation responses from indigenous people
Substitutability  between  various  goods  and  services  is  critical  for  non-market  valuation. 
However, some natural resources, places, stories and artefacts may be sacrosanct and non-
negotiable for particular indigenous clan groups. Adamowicz, et al. (1998) described such 
goods  and  services  as  taboo.  Smith  (2001)  summarised  Australian  and  international 
ethnographic research that describes types of sacred values and explains why they may be 
considered  invaluable.  In  reference  to  valuation  of  indigenous  access  to  traditional  land  in 
Australia, Godden (1999, p. 18) asserted that:
valuation  techniques  for  non-marketed  goods  may  simply  be  inappropriate  if 
indigenous peoples’ valuation of land is non-utilitarian… It may make as little sense 
to ask an indigenous person their WTA [i.e. willingness to accept compensation] 
for the loss of access to traditional living areas from which they derive ceremonial/
religious values as it would be to ask a devout Christian how much they would 
need to be compensated in monetary terms to forswear any practice of their religion. 
It is not that the estimation is difficult – in the conventional sense of problems with 
estimating values in contingent markets – but that the entire idea of forswearing for 
monetary compensation is simply nonsensical.
Stated  preference  techniques  that  elicit  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  money  or  willingness  to 
accept (monetary) compensation (WTAC) are appropriate only when respondents have a sound 
7appreciation of the purchasing power of money. Many Australian indigenous communities do 
not and there is no feasible alternative numeraire.
For many indigenous Australians, English is a second, third or fourth language. Poor reading, 
writing and numeracy skills are common in indigenous communities, which will affect survey 
comprehension and limit the capacity of respondents to articulate their preferences.
Indigenous Australians from remote communities have been observed to answer questions with 
responses they believe the interviewer wants to hear. Interviewer bias is a general problem in 
survey research but is particularly prominent in Australian indigenous culture because of this 
cultural predisposition.
Non-market valuation techniques are endogenous to the type of property rights regime the 
respondent perceives. Adamowicz et al. (1998) explained that for people who are used to 
thinking of access to resources being managed under a communal property rights system, it 
may  be  difficult  for  individuals  to  estimate  how  their  own  individual  utility  is  affected  by 
changes in property rights. Furthermore, there may be an ethical dimension associated with the 
current legal distribution of property rights between indigenous and non-indigenous people. 
Australian indigenous respondents are likely to protest at being asked their WTP for access to 
cultural goods and services that they regard as a traditional property right.
The tendency for Australian indigenous people to accumulate and share wealth among larger 
groupings of individuals than households suggests that an individual may find the task of 
estimating  their  personal  WTP  from  the  extended  family  budget  challenging.  As  Quiggin 
(1998)  notes,  the  existence  of  altruism  within  and  between  households  creates  serious 
difficulties for analysis based on WTP concepts, even when households are well-defined. 
Challenges in aggregating the responses of indigenous people
The conventional approach to estimating social welfare in stated preference methods is to sum 
the  individual  ‘votes’  of  those  sampled.  This  approach  may  not  be  useful  for  estimating 
indigenous cultural heritage values because it may not reflect actual decision-making processes 
nor be consistent with the indigenous group’s concept of social welfare. The political decision-
8making processes of many Australian indigenous cultures, particularly those in remote parts of 
the country, are still driven by elders rather than the votes of individual members.
In many economic valuation studies, identifying a representative sample is relatively simple. 
Throughout  Australia,  there  are  hundreds  of  indigenous  cultures,  each  with  their  own 
distinctive  cultural  heritage  and  aspirations  for  the  future  (Reynolds  2003).  Evidence  from 
ethnographic research suggests that extrapolating findings about cultural heritage values from a 
set  of  sampled  indigenous  cultures  to  other  cultures  is  not  feasible,  even  if  they  are 
geographically  adjacent  and  share  similar  language  dialects  (Martin  1993).  If  indigenous 
cultural heritage associated with a particular area can be valued, then it can only be valued by 
traditional owners for whom the particular sites, landscapes and stories associated with that area 
are of cultural importance (Lavarch and Riding 1998).
In Australia, factors including historic government policies of forced migration, assimilation 
and separation of family members make the task of defining the population of indigenous 
people for whom a particular place is of cultural importance highly challenging. Davies (2003) 
discussed the need to distinguish between the geography of traditional ownership of country 
and the geography of people’s residence. Traditional owners rarely all live in the same place 
and many do not live on their traditional country (Forward NRM and AATD 2003).
There are also likely to be systematic differences in the way that indigenous individuals or 
groups  within  a  particular  clan  value  their  cultural  heritage.  Clifford  (2001)  reported  that 
obtaining representative views from all elements of an Australian indigenous community can 
only be achieved after an ethnographic study over a considerable length of time.
Challenges in aggregating indigenous and non-indigenous welfare
Relative to non-indigenous Australians, indigenous Australians typically have low incomes and 
many live in conditions that non-indigenous Australians could not and would not tolerate. A 
problem with stated preference techniques is that the economic votes of the poor count for less 
in the market place than the economic votes of the rich – the bias of intragenerational incidence 
(Pearce et al. 1994). Many non-indigenous Australians are sceptical about the existence and 
character of indigenous sacred sites (McWilliam 1998). The 97.6 per cent of the Australian 
9population who are non-indigenous (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002) are likely to place a 
lower value on indigenous cultural heritage than indigenous Australians. Policy decisions based 
on an estimate of aggregate social welfare elicited with WTP or WTAC techniques are likely to 
be affected by the systematic difference in the distribution of income between indigenous and 
non-indigenous people, with non-indigenous valuations ‘swamping’ the valuations made by 
indigenous people. Although the use of equity weights has been proposed as a remedy in these 
circumstances, such methods are commonly criticised and rarely adopted (Pearce et al. 1994).
Many of the highlighted challenges to non-market valuation of indigenous cultural heritage are 
more naturally expressed in terms of rights than aggregate benefits and costs. This suggests a 
need for price-based measures to be replaced by or complemented with quantitative constraints, 
reflecting the requirement that rights should not be violated.
Accounting for Indigenous Cultural Heritage Values Within the MCA Framework: The 
Case of Wik Forestry on Cape York Peninsula
Wik, Wik-Way and Kugu people (Wik people) of Aurukun Shire on Cape York Peninsula in 
Queensland, north eastern Australia, aspire to economic independence. Successful native title 
determinations in Wik Peoples v State of Queensland and Others 1996 in the High Court and 
Wik Peoples v State of Queensland 2000; 2004 in the Federal Court, appear to have conferred 
upon  Wik  people  rights  to  utilise  timber  resources  for  commercial  purposes  (Venn 
forthcoming). The 0.4 million hectares of Eucalyptus tetrodonta (Darwin stringybark) native 
forest on traditional Wik land, has been identified as a potential engine to drive their vision of 
economic  independence  (Venn  2004a).  Balkanu  Cape  York  Development  Corporation 
representatives of Wik people sought an assessment of the financial feasibility of a timber 
industry on Wik land and the development of a suite of culturally appropriate forestry strategies 
that could satisfy the multiple forestry objectives of Wik people. As part of this research, Venn 
(2004b)  assessed  the  potential  for  the  BCA  framework  to  accommodate  their  multiple 
objectives, including protection of cultural heritage. Several impediments were identified.
1. There was no penetration of the cash economy in Aurukun township until the 
mid-1960s and cash has only become a major part of the local economy since the mid-1970s. 
10Wik people are largely excluded from the market economy and are financially dependant on 
government programs. It is evident from casual conversation with Wik people that many 
individuals, particularly elders (the decision-makers) still do not have an appreciation of the 
purchasing power of money, including the value of natural resources on traditional land. 
However, Aurukun town is not a subsistence economy and no numeraire other than money 
appears to be feasible for eliciting WTP or WTAC. 
2. The 900 Wik people of Aurukun are not a cohesive group of people, but a complex of 
23 allied and competing clan groups with several distinct cultures, languages and dialects, 
totems and territorial affiliations, and variable status, power and authority. 
3. English is not a first language for Wik people and many have poor reading, writing and 
numeracy skills that would seriously impede conducting a questionnaire.
4. Gatekeepers3 are strongly opposed to research methodologies that utilise individual 
questionnaires.
5. Aurukun Shire is an area where a traditional indigenous cultural environment still 
prevails. Most important decisions affecting clan members are made by Wik elders, not by the 
votes of all individuals concerned. 
6. The Wik are tired of contributing to surveys, meetings and reports, which historically 
have never led to improved outcomes for their people.
7. Many Wik people have difficulty comprehending the potential consequences of non-
indigenous forestry practices. Casual conversation indicated that Wik people regard their forest 
resource as being virtually infinite, such that any form of forestry disturbance, including large-
scale woodchipping, could be absorbed with relatively minimal impact on cultural heritage and 
the environment. 
Given these challenges to conducting a BCA, MCA was explored as an alternative approach to 
assess forestry policies for Wik people. Venn (2004b) reviewed the appropriateness of five 
MCA methods, namely linear programming, goal programming, simulation, range of values 
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3 Gatekeepers are people or organisations who act a sieve at the ‘gates’ of an indigenous community, only 
allowing entry into the community and access to key indigenous persons to people, such as. researchers, 
business people and government officials, whose philosophies and objectives coincide with theirs. method  and  the  analytic  hierarchy  process.  The  unique  decision-making  environment  of 
Aurukun Shire suggested that a suitable MCA technique must possess three characteristics. 
First,  as  a  result  of  Wik  people’s  frustration  with  recent  attempts  to  involve  them  in 
participatory  land-use  planning  and  a  desire  to  retain  the  option  not  to  ‘own’  the  forestry 
strategies generated (providing the Wik with an avenue to exit the forestry evaluation process), 
the approach must not require Wik people to participate in the early development of alternative 
forestry options. Wik people would like information about a set of potential timber industry 
strategies  that  they  can  review  in  their  own  time  and  space,  becoming  involved  in  project 
selection and development after several forestry opportunities have been defined.
Second, the evaluation technique must provide the decision-maker with an array of performance 
measures and allow decision criteria to be measured in standard (traditional) units that Wik 
people can understand. Measurement of decision criteria in (or transformation of standard units 
of measurement into) non-standard units is unlikely to facilitate this. It is also important that 
each Wik forestry objective is individually represented in the model, as opposed to a single, 
proxy measure. Third, the evaluation technique must facilitate a continuous decision space, 
because a well-defined set of timber utilisation alternatives does not exist for traditional Wik 
land. 
Goal programming was found to best satisfy the evaluation criteria. This method requires no 
formal participation of indigenous people during model development, facilitates the evaluation 
of forestry strategies with multiple performance criteria measured in standard units and has a 
continuous decision space. The only model inputs elicited from Wik people were insights into 
Wik forestry objectives gained via informal discussions on country with groups of elders. 
These  discussions  took  place  during  rest  periods  while  undertaking  contemporary  and 
traditional land management activities. For the purposes of goal programming, Venn (2004b) 
expressed  Wik  forestry  objectives  in  terms  of  five  goals,  which  in  decreasing  order  of 
importance are to:
1. maximise total employment generation;
2. maximise employment generation on country;
123. maximise income generation;
4. minimise forest area harvested south of the Archer River; and
5. minimise forest area harvested north of the Archer River and outside of mining leases.
The ‘on country employment generation’ goal combined the cultural and social aspirations of 
Wik elders to facilitate better connection of people with country and to encourage population 
decentralisation. The ‘minimise forest area harvested’ goals reflect the desire of Wik people to 
preserve their cultural heritage, protect the environment and retain the option of managing these 
forest areas for other economic purposes, including ecotourism. Effectively these two goals 
restrict harvesting to areas where cultural heritage and environmental values are presently or 
will in the future be degraded by the actions of bauxite mining companies. Achievement of the 
income goal is measured in millions of dollars in net present value. Therefore, although the 
achievement of other goals is measured in non-pecuniary terms, shadow prices can be derived.
It  was  not  possible  to  elicit  specific  goal  aspiration  levels  from  Wik  people.  The  author 
interpreted Wik forestry objectives as a desire to generate as much employment and income as 
possible, while minimising forest harvested south of the Archer River and in particular areas 
north of the Archer River to as close to zero as possible. It was also impossible to elicit Wik 
preferences regarding tradeoffs between the performance levels of goals (goal weights). In the 
absence of precise preference structure information, four preference structures were examined – 
two of a lexicographic nature that do not permit tradeoffs between goals, and two that allow 
tradeoffs between all goals in accordance with weights that reflect the relative importance of 
each goal. It was hoped that Wik people could select preferred forestry strategies (and therefore 
implicitly select particular goal weights) from among those generated by the model and that this 
information could be used to iteratively modify goal weights until forestry strategies closely 
reflected  actual  Wik  preferences.  In  this  way,  Wik  valuation  of  on  country   employment 
generation, and cultural heritage and environmental conservation could be indirectly revealed.
The goal programming analysis identified optimal4 timber utilisation strategies for six budget 
constraint  levels  (ranging  from  $0.25  million  to  $10  million),  four  economic  environment 
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the term ‘optimal’ is used in the broad sense, i.e. the optimal solution generated by goal programming.scenarios (regarding property rights to timber and markets for timber products) and four goal 
weight structures from the private perspective of the Wik population of Aurukun town. When 
Wik elders and the Wik Timber Crew (responsible for small-scale timber production for local 
domestic use) were presented with a set of forestry policies generated by the goal program in 
December 2004, the response received was that all options developed by the goal programming 
model were sound. This appears to indicate that the goals and constraints set in the model have 
defined  a  decision  space  where  Wik  forestry  objectives,  including  protection  of  cultural 
heritage, are well satisfied, and that Wik people need time to consider forestry opportunities at 
their own pace. At the time of writing (May 2005), the Wik are continuing to explore their 
forestry options with private sawmilling enterprises and other indigenous communities on Cape 
York Peninsula.
Accommodating Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Water Reform Policies in the Murray 
Darling Basin
The Murray–Darling Basin covers 1 million square kilometres in four states and the Australian 
Capital Territory in south eastern Australia. The region is home for about 2 million  people and 
accounted for 41 per cent of the total value of national farm-gate agricultural output in 2001 
(adapted from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003). Rapid expansion of irrigation in the Basin 
during the 20th century led to nearly 100 per cent of normally available flows being allocated 
and water in many catchments being overallocated (Adamson et al. 2005). This has resulted in 
the deterioration of river health, including salinisation, waterlogging, algal blooms and death of 
centuries-old river red gums (Eucalyptus camaldulensis). 
Quiggin (2001) provided an overview of the environmental problems of the Murray–Darling 
Basin from an economics perspective. Water policy reform in the Basin has been a priority for 
Australian  governments  since  the  Council  of  Australian  Governments  (COAG),  the  peak 
intergovernmental forum involving federal, state and territory governments, agreed to a water 
reform framework in 1994 (Adamson et al. 2005). 
The  Basin  is  the  traditional  homeland  of  many  distinct  indigenous  cultures,  including  the 
Wiradjuri, Yorta Yorta, Snowy Mountain Nations, Barapa Barapa, Wamba Wamba, Muthi 
14Muthi,  Nyampa,  Latji  Latji,  Wadi  Wadi,  Wergaia,  Barkanji  and  Ngarrinjeri  (Morgan  et  al. 
2004). In 2001, there were almost 70,000 indigenous people resident in the Basin, representing 
15 per cent of the national indigenous population (Taylor and Biddle 2004). 
Indigenous  residents  are  socio-economically  disadvantaged  relative  to  non-indigenous 
residents.  The  unemployment  rate  among  indigenous  people  in  the  MDB  in  2001  was 
approximately 25 per cent — over four times the level for the non-indigenous population. 
About one-fifth of the indigenous labour force was employed by work for welfare programs 
(Taylor and Biddle 2004). 
Each cultural group comprises several separate clans with their own territorial affiliations and 
unique cultural heritage associated with the riverine environment. This heritage is expressed and 
evidenced in many ways, including as:
• sources of traditional foods (wild game, fish and plants);
• sources of traditional tools, arts and crafts;
• classrooms for passing on indigenous knowledge to children;
• settings for Dreamtime stories;
• habitat for clan totem beings;
• religious places;
• burial places;
• physical evidence of traditional occupation, including campsites, shell middens, fish 
traps and scarred trees;
• venues for traditional ceremonies;
• battlegrounds in the wars of resistance against Europeans;
• clan or tribe boundary markers; and
• recreational areas.
Land and water degradation arising from past and current resource management policies is 
destroying culturally important places and landscapes, and endangering local populations of 
various species of native flora and fauna with which local indigenous cultures have evolved 
(Forward NRM and AATD 2003; Morgan et al. 2004). For many reasons, but particularly 
15because of their spiritual and cultural ties to the rivers, creeks, billabongs and wetlands on 
traditional country, indigenous people want to be involved in natural resource management in 
the Basin (Langton 2002; Murray Darling Basin Commission  2002).
Water rights of indigenous people of the Murray–Darling Basin
Across the Basin, the contemporary legal rights of indigenous people to beneficial use of land, 
water and other natural resources amounts to only a small fraction of the total resources. To 
protect and revitalise their traditional cultures, indigenous people of the MDB seek rights to 
(Morgan et al. 2004):
• be substantively involved in policy and decision-making regarding the MDB;
• be directly involved in environmental management in the MDB;
• use and take water;
• use and enjoy other natural resources, for example through hunting and fishing;
• protect cultural heritage and identity;
• economic development;
• self-determination; and
• enjoy the same level of human rights as non-indigenous Australians.
The Native Title Act 1993 (Fed) generates uncertainty about the existing property rights in water 
in the Murray–Darling Basin. The native title rights to customary uses of natural resources, 
including those that are dependant on inland water, are guaranteed by this legislation, but the 
ability of indigenous people of the Basin to exercise these rights is affected by the allocation of 
water to other purposes. If future water use developments impair or extinguish native title 
rights, then the Act  requires that native title holders be compensated. However, the procedure 
by which indigenous people would be compensated for impaired or extinguished rights to 
maintain their cultural heritage is unclear (Altman and Cochrane 2003).
As at May 2005, there have been three determinations of native title in the Murray–Darling 
Basin  – Deniliquin Local Aboriginal Land Council 2001 and Lawson v Minister for Land and 
16Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales 2004 (on behalf of the Barkandji people) 
in the Federal Court, and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria 2002 
in the High Court. In contrast to the success enjoyed by the Wik on Cape York Peninsula, 
native title was found to have been extinguished without the need for compensation to be paid 
to the indigenous claimants in all three cases.
In  the  most  publicised  case,  the  Yorta  Yorta  sought  native  title  rights  over  1,860  square 
kilometres of crown land and waterways scattered within traditional estate boundaries around 
the Murray, Ovens and Goulburn Rivers in Victoria and New South Wales. The native title 
rights claimed included: the right to use, occupy, inhabit and possess the area and the mineral 
and other natural resources found in or below the area; the right to restrict access of others; and 
the right to exercise their rights, obligations and duties in accordance with their traditional laws 
and customs. The Yorta Yorta were the first (and at the time of writing are still the only) 
indigenous  Australians  to  have  had  their  native  title  claim  rejected  on  the  basis  that  the 
traditional laws and customs of the original inhabitants are no longer observed by the claimants.
In  2005,  there  are  more  than  30  registered  and  unregistered  applications  for  native  title  in 
progress throughout the Basin (National Native Title Tribunal 2005). Whether or not future 
native  title  claims  are  successful,  there  exist  strong  ethical  grounds  for  accommodating  or 
compensating for extinguished indigenous water rights. Ethical considerations appear to have 
been  a  major  motivation  behind  the  State  of  Victoria  signing  a  co-management  regional 
agreement with Yorta Yorta people in 2004 over 50,000 hectares (27 per cent of their failed 
native title claim) of crown land and waterways outside of the native title process (Victorian 
Department of Justice and Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment 2004). 
COAG  and  the  Murray  Darling  Basin  Commission  (MDBC,  an  intergovernmental  body 
responsible for efficiently managing the water resources of the Basin) have recently formally 
acknowledged the need to account for the customary rights of traditional owners in formulating 
water policy (Altman and Cochrane 2003; Morgan et al. 2004). To date, basin managers have 
engaged with indigenous people to identify types of indigenous cultural heritage values and 
establish formal processes by which indigenous people can contribute to decision-making, such 
as  allowing  for  indigenous  representation  on  various  resource  management  committees 
17(Economic and Social Policy Branch 2001; Morgan et al. 2004). However, the problem of how 
to best account for tradeoffs between the rights of indigenous people to preserve their cultural 
heritage and the rights of the environment and domestic and commercial users of water, has not 
been addressed by researchers.
Resource assessment and indigenous cultural heritage in water policy analysis in the 
Murray–Darling Basin
Unlike the case of Wik forestry, no attempt has yet been made to quantitatively account for 
indigenous  cultural  heritage  in  water  policy  reform  in  the  Murray–Darling  Basin.  The 
appropriateness  of  particular  price-based  and  quantity-based  techniques  to  accommodate 
indigenous cultural heritage values in water policy analysis will vary spatially and between 
indigenous cultures in the Basin. A thorough review of ethnographic research is beyond the 
scope of this paper and the following discussion proceeds at a general level applicable to the 
Basin as a whole.
Indigenous people of the Murray–Darling Basin   are generally less well educated than non-
indigenous residents; however, they are, on average, better educated than the Wik of north 
Queensland.  A  much  greater  proportion  of  indigenous  people  in  the  Basin  have  market 
economy work skills and experience than Wik people, including many highly educated and 
respected individuals. Consequently, some challenges of eliciting individual responses from 
indigenous  people,  such  as  unfamiliarity  with  the  purchasing  power  of  money,  and  poor 
English literacy and numeracy skills, are likely to be less severe in the Basin than on Cape York 
Peninsula. Nevertheless, major challenges remain.
In general, indigenous people are concerned that their lack of understanding about the economic 
and environmental issues affecting the Murray–Darling Basin, and limited human and financial 
capital  will  put  them  at  great  disadvantage  relative  to  other  stakeholders   and  curb   the 
effectiveness with which they will be able to participate in decision-making about management 
of the Basin (NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation 2001; Forward NRM and 
AATD 2003). A price-based assessment would require indigenous people to consider various 
implications of hypothetical policy alternatives upon their individual welfare, even though many 
18respondents are likely to have a limited understanding about the implications of their choices.
At community meetings organised by the MDBC in 2003, indigenous people of the Basin 
strongly asserted their rights to cultural water flows under their legitimate claim to being the 
first human water users of the Basin (Morgan et al. 2004). Should some of the many native title 
applications in progress be ultimately successful, the Native Title Act would raise the legal 
priority of indigenous cultural water flows above other interests. Given the perceived and legal 
incidence of native title property rights to water, eliciting the WTP of indigenous people for 
water appears to be an inappropriate strategy for policy analysis.
One of the major frustrations that indigenous people of the Basin experience when working 
with non-indigenous people to manage cultural heritage is the discrete site based approach 
typically adopted (Forward NRM and AATD 2003). The supposition has been that, so long as 
key  places  such  as  burial  and  cultural  artefact  sites  are  protected  by  resource  management 
strategies, other cultural heritage values will also be protected. This ignores the diversity of 
indigenous  cultural  heritage  values  associated  with  the  riverine  environment  of  the  Basin, 
including the high level of importance that indigenous people place on overall landscape health. 
Particular levels of water flow are essential and non-negotiable for the maintenance of the 
cultural heritage of various indigenous groups, presenting a major impediment to economic 
methods that elicit prices.
There  are  also  likely  to  be  considerable  challenges  to  overcome  in  aggregating  individual 
responses of indigenous people in a price-based valuation of water allocation policies in the 
Basin. Even within a single management region of the Basin, a comprehensive valuation of 
indigenous cultural heritage is likely to involve several indigenous cultures and several clans 
from each cultural group. Given that the allocation of water in one part of the Basin deprives 
stakeholders downstream of that water, it may also be pertinent to examine indigenous cultural 
heritage values for people downstream of a specific study area.
Due to historical factors, many indigenous communities in the Basin   comprise indigenous 
people who are not traditional owners of land near the community in which they live. For 
example, Smyth et al. (2004) estimated that perhaps only 15% of the indigenous population in 
19the Central West region of the Murray–Darling Basin are traditional owners. 
Nevertheless,  Sutton  (1998)  concluded  that  clan  membership  that  associates  people  with  a 
particular region has proved to be resilient in south eastern Australia, including the Murray–
Darling Basin. People identify with and care for traditional country even if they have been 
distant from it for a considerable period of time. An ethnographic study defining the various 
traditional owner populations (and therefore, who can and cannot speak for country) will have 
to precede any assessment of indigenous cultural heritage values. This study would also need to 
identify age and gender cultural roles within each clan of each indigenous nation to ensure that a 
suitable sampling framework is developed to account for systematic differences in the way that 
indigenous individuals or groups within a particular clan value their cultural heritage.
While the political structures of some indigenous societies of the Murray–Darling Basin have 
evolved  to  become  similar  to  Western  society,  in  many  others  decision-making  is  still  the 
responsibility of elders. Particularly in the latter case, the indigenous concept of social welfare 
is likely to differ from the non-indigenous economic concept and therefore standard welfare 
estimation  techniques  may  not  meaningfully  estimate  indigenous  welfare  in  the  Basin.  The 
systematic  socio-economic  disadvantage  of  indigenous  people  relative  to  non-indigenous 
people also presents a considerable challenge to aggregating indigenous and non-indigenous 
valuations of indigenous cultural heritage.
Approaches to resource assessment in the MDB
The preceding paragraphs have highlighted several challenges to accommodating indigenous 
cultural heritage values in a BCA framework for policy analysis in the Murray–Darling Basin. 
The authors do not argue that it is impossible to value indigenous cultural heritage, but rather 
that total economic valuation of indigenous cultural heritage will require extensive preliminary 
research and a large commitment of financial and human resources. If resources do not permit a 
comprehensive  BCA  (always  the  case?),  then  the  BCA  process  will  require  a  subjective 
political process to be inserted where valuation efforts fail. BCA is then no more objective than 
price or quantity-based MCA.
An appropriate technique for the Basin is likely to be one that facilitates an iterative engagement 
20process that recognises the need for indigenous people to be given sufficient time to understand 
and integrate technical information with their own perspectives and views. The technique must 
also not require indigenous people to participate in multi-stakeholder forums where they may 
feel  disadvantaged  or  require  indigenous  people  to  make  comparisons  between  water 
management policies about which they may know little. This is unlikely to be consistent with 
economists  ‘parachuting’  into  an  indigenous  community  for  several  days  to  conduct  a 
workshop  or  non-market  valuation  survey.  However,  these  considerations  do  suggest  that 
representation of the problem as one of choice over a convex set in quantity-space, as opposed 
to  a  price-based  comparison  of  discrete  options,  is  likely  to  provide  a  suitable  alternative 
framework.
A quantity-based assessment could be performed in the Basin in a manner that avoids the major 
concern with price-based approaches – the lack of substitutability between cultural goods and 
services and other goods and services – by incorporating minimum acceptable protection levels 
for cultural heritage as constraints bounding the decision space. Examples include constraints 
on land area conserved or volume of water flow. This quantity-constraint approach is more 
consistent with the Australian indigenous world view and the legal incidence of property rights 
to water under the Native Title Act. 
A focus on quantities rather than prices means that challenges associated with using money as 
the single decision criterion in an indigenous context, including the systematic differences in 
income levels between indigenous and non-indigenous people, can be avoided. Quantity-based 
approaches  can  also  reduce  challenges  associated  with  aggregating  indigenous  and  non-
indigenous responses by treating them as separate (potentially non-commensurate) management 
objectives. However, preference weights for each management objective are still required and 
these will implicitly provide shadow prices. 
Indigenous  representatives  for  a  quantity-based  evaluation  procedure  could  be  selected  by 
indigenous people to be compatible with the internal political regime of their traditional owner 
group. For example, if elders make decisions (not individual clan members) then the clan’s 
representatives may consist of elders. Not only is this approach likely to be more consistent 
with  traditional  political  structures,  but  successful  implementation  will  also  require  a 
21substantially lower level of preliminary ethnographic research relative to BCA.
As found when analysing Wik forestry opportunities, goal programming appears well suited to 
the problem of incorporating indigenous cultural heritage into policy analysis in the MDB. Goal 
programming only requires that indigenous people can declare their non-negotiable cultural 
heritage  management  constraints  (hard  constraints)  and  their  negotiable  cultural  heritage 
management constraints (goals). Remaining parameters and constraints can be elicited from 
other stakeholders and experts. 
Cultural heritage constraints could be elicited through informal discussions held with elders and 
other custodians of indigenous cultural heritage. While it may not be possible to elicit specific 
quantity constraints from indigenous people, descriptive management aims, for example that a 
particular wetland is flooded in Spring to at least a particular level, should be sufficient for the 
analyst  to  quantitatively  estimate  constraint  levels.  Because  indigenous  people  are  the  only 
experts on cultural heritage constraint levels, they will not be disadvantaged relative to other 
stakeholders.
Concluding comments
Internationally, there is a growing body of literature reporting valuations of particular elements 
of indigenous cultural heritage (particularly use values) for resource evaluation. However, no 
attempt at total economic valuation of indigenous cultural heritage values has been published. In 
this paper, we have argued that it is unlikely to be feasible to achieve a total economic valuation 
of indigenous cultural heritage using price-based non-market valuation techniques 
One alternative would be to return to the ‘partial economic valuation’ approach traditionally 
used in BCA in which cultural values are simply excluded from the analysis. A preferable 
approach  may  be  to  incorporate  information  about  cultural  heritage  values  in  the  form  of 
quantitative goals and constraints, and to analyse the problem of selecting an optimal policy or 
preferred set of policies from within a convex set of alternatives specified in quantity space. An 
advantage of such techniques is that there is no requirement to explicitly assign dollar values to 
indigenous cultural heritage, as is the aim in total economic valuation. In addition, quantity-
based techniques can accommodate the rights of indigenous people to protect their cultural 
22heritage as quantity constraints on the decision space, which, relative to the BCA framework, 
better captures the reality that many indigenous people regard elements of cultural heritage as 
non-tradeable.
Goal programming, a continuous and quantity-based MCA technique, successfully generated 
forest management policies for Wik people while accommodating indigenous cultural heritage 
values as goals and hard constraints that defined the decision space. Goal programming also 
appears to be a promising cross-cultural policy analysis technique for water allocation in the 
Murray–Darling Basin.
One challenge for economists is to explore means of modifying social welfare theories and 
non-market valuation methods to account for the social welfare concepts, communal property 
rights regimes and political structures of indigenous communities. It may be more appropriate 
for stated preference techniques to be modified to elicit responses from the heads of extended 
families rather than individual members of the group. Also, gradual engagement of researchers 
with  indigenous  communities  over  an  extended  time  period  is  required  to  overcome  the 
suspicions and concerns that many indigenous people have about working with ‘outsiders’. 
New  forms  of  equity  weights  could  perhaps  be  investigated  to  facilitate  aggregation  of 
indigenous and non-indigenous welfare. 
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